THE AMERICAN PROBLEM
America’s jobs recovery is proceeding on two separate tracks—a pattern that is persisting far longer than after past economic rebounds and lately has been growing worse.
(…) Youth unemployment, for example, nearly always improves after recessions more slowly than that of prime-age workers, those between 25 and 54. Following the 2001 recession, it took six months for the gap between the youth and prime-age unemployment rates to return to its long-run average. After the early 1990s recession, it took 30 months. This time, it has been 52 months, and the gap has hardly narrowed.
For those with decent jobs, wages are rising, albeit slowly, and job security is the strongest it has been since before the recession. Many families have paid down debts and are seeing the value of assets, from homes to stocks, rebound strongly.
But many others—the young, the less educated and particularly the unemployed—are experiencing hardly any recovery at all. Hiring remains weak, and the jobs that are available are disproportionately low-paying and often part-time. Wage growth is nearly nonexistent, in part because with so many people still looking for jobs, workers have little bargaining power.
The two-track nature of the recovery helps explain why the four-year-old upturn still doesn’t feel like one to many Americans. Higher earners are spending on cars, electronics and luxury items, boosting profits for the companies that make and sell such goods. But much of the rest of the economy remains stuck: Companies won’t hire or raise pay without more demand, and consumers can’t spend more without faster hiring and fatter paychecks. (…)
Net job growth near zero, say data
Employment growth in the US’s sparsely populated heartland has stagnated since the economy began to recover in 2010, according to official data that underscore the weakening economic power of rural America.
The data, from this year’s US Department of Agriculture’s Rural America at a Glance report, show that while employment in both urban and rural areas fell by 5 per cent during the 2007-09 recession and recovered by a similar level in 2010, their prospects have since diverged. Since the start of 2011, net job growth in non-metropolitan areas has been near zero, while it has averaged 1.4 per cent annually in metropolitan areas.
The report notes that rural job growth stagnation has coincided with the first-ever recorded net population decline in those regions, driven by a drop in the number of new migrants moving in. This means the unemployment rate in rural regions has not risen, since fewer people are seeking work.
Population loss has meant fewer jobs as demand for goods and services falls, which in turn encourages those with higher skills to move away. (…)
In summary (chart from Doug Short):
Americans are seeing the lowest pump prices for gasoline since February 2011, AAA says.
Gas prices dropped 6.6 cent per gallon the past week to $3.186, which is down 25.3 cents from a year earlier.
That’s a 7.4% drop YoY! Right before Christmas. Chain store sales rose 1.2% last week, boosting the 4-week moving average to +2.1% YoY.
The scheme launched in 2008 is due to run out
(…) Unless Congress takes action to renew it again, about 1.3m long-term unemployed would see their benefits halted at the end of the year, and a further 850,000 would be denied access to the benefits in the first three months of next year, according to a report from the National Employment Law Project, an advocacy group. (…)
Federal assistance for the long-term unemployed was launched in 2008, during the last recession, and renewed until the end of this year. Michael Feroli, a senior economist at JPMorgan Chase, has estimated that the expiry of the federal jobless benefits would trim about 0.4 percentage points off annualised gross domestic product growth in the first quarter of next year. This is roughly equivalent to estimates of the hit to US output produced by last month’s US government shutdown. (…)
Fall arrived literally this month, as small business optimism dropped from 93.9 to 91.6, largely due to a precipitous decline in hiring plans and expectations for future smal -business conditions. Of the ten Index components, seven turned negative, falling a total of 27 percentage points. The stalemate in early October over funding the government as well as the failed “launch” of the Obamacare website left 68% of owners feeling that the current period is a bad time to expand; 37% of those owners identified the political climate in Washington as the culprit—a record high level.
Economic growth is set to pick up in the euro zone, China and the U.K., while remaining sluggish in India, Brazil and Russia.
LE PROBLÈME FRANÇAIS (from Reuters’ AlphaNow):
Many euro-zone indicators have taken on a more promising outlook in recent months. Credit ratings firms are beginning to reflect that.
The direction of travel can be more important than where on the journey you are. That’s particularly true of the euro zone and the credit ratings assigned to its member states. November’s actions—a downgrade for France and improvements in outlooks for Spain and Portugal—send some key signals. The euro zone is undergoing adjustment, although not all its members are yet on the right track.
France’s downgrade to double-A by Standard & Poor’s might look like the most important action, but isn’t. French bond yields hardly reacted; strategists at Royal Bank of Scotland told investors to “ignore” the cut. That is quite right; France faces no immediate threat that should cause bond yields to spike higher.
Still, the rationale is cause for long-term worry: France is falling behind. “French exporters appear to continue to be losing market share to those European competitors whose governments have more effectively loosened the structural rigidities in their economies,” S&P warned. The European Commission last week forecast that net exports would contribute just 0.1 percentage point to French growth of 0.9% in 2014 and be a slight drag on growth in 2015. France’s government still hasn’t found the right policy direction to regain competitiveness.
More significant was Fitch’s decision to raise Spain’s rating outlook to stable from negative, the first of the major ratings firms to do so. Spain won plaudits for its fiscal and structural reforms, and the move to surplus in its current account. That is an important turnaround: Spain was on the front line of the crisis just 18 months ago.
Most interesting of all was Moody‘s move to a stable outlook from negative on Portugal. Moody’s is becoming rapidly less bearish on the euro zone. At the start of September, it had just two euro-zone sovereigns with a stable outlook; now there are six. The big move for Moody’s would be to shift Spain back to a stable outlook. The decision on Portugal provided a glint of hope, with Moody’s highlighting the benefit of a recovery in Spain, its key trading partner.
Ratings are often dismissed as backward-looking, and downgrades or upgrades are frequently priced in long before they actually happen. But outlooks can provide new information to the market. That is where investors should look for signposts.
Concerns rise as Gulf states delay investment due to US shale revolution
(…) Mr Birol was speaking as the Paris-based IEA unveiled its annual outlook for the energy market. Its 2012 forecast that the US would be a net oil exporter by 2030 helped bring shale oil production to global attention. But this year the organisation downplayed the significance of US production growth, with Mr Birol calling shale “a surge, rather than revolution”.
The IEA still expects US oil output to reduce the world’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil in the near term: it now forecasts that the US will displace Saudi Arabia as the world’s biggest oil producer in 2015, two years earlier than it had estimated just 12 months ago.
But it expects US light tight oil production, which includes shale, to peak in 2020 and decline thereafter, even as global demand continues to grow to 101m barrels a day by 2035, from around 90m b/d today.
Outside the US, light tight oil production is only expected to contribute 1.5m b/d of supplies by 2035, as countries such as Russia and China make limited progress towards unlocking their shale reserves.
That will leave the market once more dependent on crude from the Opec oil cartel, of which Gulf producers are key members. (…)
But the IEA expects domestic demand in the Middle East to hit 10m b/d by 2035 – equal to China’s current consumption – thanks to subsidies for petrol and electricity, even as foreign demand for Gulf oil increases.
Mr Birol said the Gulf states needed to invest significantly now to meet rising demand after 2020, because projects take several years to begin producing. But he said he was concerned Gulf countries were misinterpreting the impact of rising US shale production. (…)
Gulf producers have taken a cautious approach to investment in recent years, in the face of fast growing US output. Saudi Arabia does not plan to increase its oil production capacity in the next 30 years, as new sources of supply, from US shale to Canadian oil sands, fill the demand gap.
The UAE is reported to have pushed back its target for raising production capacity to 3.5m b/d to 2020 from 2017, while Kuwait is struggling to overcome rapid decline rates from its existing fields. (…)
Charles Schwab’s Liz Ann Sonders posted this good Ned Davis chart, although her bullishness dictated her to write that sentiment was “a bit” stretched.
Sentiment does look a bit stretched in the short-term, with both the Ned Davis Crowd Sentiment Poll and SentimenTrader’s Smart Money/Dumb Money Confidence Poll showing elevated (extreme) levels of optimism.
Since 1995, being in such a “bit stretched” territory has not been profitable, on average:
This next chart, posted by ZeroHedge, is nothing to help sentiment get less stretched.
Note however that the latest tally from S&P reveals that estimates for Q3 have turned up to $27.02 ($26.77 last week) while the forecast for Q4 is now $28.23 ($28.38 last week).